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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Department of Education informed Massachusetts’ Commissioner of 
Elementary and Secondary Education that the present structure for special education 
hearing officers and mediators is not in compliance with the IDEA requirement that 
they not be employees of the state education agency.  In fulfillment of RFR # 
09FINJW1, the impartial consultant offers an analysis of the practices in other states 
and the perceptions in Massachusetts to help the Commissioner formulate and 
evaluate options for his response regarding the structure for special education 
hearings and mediations in the Commonwealth.  
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This report to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary 
Education is organized into two basic parts.  The first part includes introductory 
information about the report’s genesis, author, scope, focus, and context.  The second part 
consists of the author’s observations and his discussion of the structural options to help 
the Commissioner formulate his decision as to the appropriate organizational model and 
“home” for the Commonwealth’s mediation and hearing officer system for special 
education cases. 
 
 
PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Author/Consultant 
 
The author of this report (referred to herein as “the consultant”) is university 
professor of education and law at Lehigh University.  He has a Ph.D. in educational 
administration and a J.D. from the University of Connecticut and an LL.M. from Yale 
University.  He has not served as an attorney for school districts or parents, instead 
devoting his career to impartial roles, including 30 years as a professor at Lehigh; 18 
years as a special education review officer in Pennsylvania; and writer/researcher of more 
than 1,000 publications, with the primary focus being special education law. 
 
 
Background/Boundaries 
 
In January 2009, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education (Department) issued a public Request for Response (RFR) that led to this 
consultancy.  The “Scope of Services” in the RFR stated the relevant background and 
boundaries:  
 
In a letter dated January 15, 2009, the United States Department of 
Education (USED) notified the … Department that its structure for 
conducting special education hearings and mediations was not in 
compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  
This notification came in response to an inquiry from Education 
Commissioner Mitchell Chester.  The letter states that IDEA requires that 
hearing officers and mediators not be employees of the state education 
agency. 
 
USED has given the Department until April 15, 2009 to submit a plan to 
bring the state into full compliance with IDEA.1  In formulating that 
response, the Department seeks the assistance of an impartial outside 
consultant.  The consultant will work collaboratively with the Department 
to help formulate options for its response to USED regarding the structure 
for special education hearings and mediations in the Commonwealth.  The 
consultant will conduct meetings and will gather information with the 
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Department from attorneys who represent parents and students, school 
districts, and state agencies before the Bureau of Special Education 
Appeals; advocacy groups; current Bureau employees; and other key 
constituents.  The consultant will assist the Department in reviewing 
systems for conducting special education mediations and hearings in other 
states to inform the Commissioner’s decision regarding how to structure 
the system for special education hearings and mediations. 
 
 
Current Structure 
 
 The Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) is a unit currently within the 
Department that consists of a director and assistant director; 6 full-time hearing officers; 
8 mediators with a coordinator; and 4.5 administrative support personnel along with a 
scheduler.  During the most recent year, the BSEA received approximately 500 hearing 
requests, reportedly resulting in approximately 85% resolved via mediation and 34 
adjudicated decisions.2
 
 
 
Consultant Activities 
 
The sources of information of this report included the following activities: 
 
• 3 heterogeneous “focus group” sessions with various stakeholders, including 
school district administrators, parent and district attorneys and organizational 
representatives 
 
• 2 meetings with the BSEA hearing officers and mediators, including their 
Union representative 
 
• in-person interviews with Commissioner Mitchell Chester and associate 
commissioner Jeff Wulfson, current BSEA director Rich Connolly and 
assistant director Reece Erlichman; other Department representatives; and 
former BSEA director Dan Ahearn 
 
• telephone interviews with Massachusetts Senator O’Leary and Massachusetts 
Representatives L’Italien, Harkins, Sannicandro, and Walz 
 
• an empirical national survey of the state hearing officer systems and review of 
Massachusetts special education director Marcia Mittnacht’s concomitant, 
qualitative survey (i.e., with more extensive commentary from the 
respondents) concerning the hearing officer and mediator systems in other 
states  
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•  review of relevant available documents3
 
 and, within the procedure pursuant to 
various foregoing meetings and interviews, the e-mail submitted by interested 
individuals 
On the other hand, the consultant’s scope of activity did not include analysis of the legal 
requirements in Massachusetts for a change in the organizational structure for special 
education mediations and hearings.  Similarly, it did not extend to determining the 
specific feasibility of any particular organizational arrangement or host. 
 
 
Contextual Consideration 
 
As an overall matter, it is important to understand that special education hearings 
under the IDEA effectively consists of two “worlds”—a small group of approximately 
nine states, which account for almost 90% of the adjudicated decisions, and the 
remaining states, where such litigation is more the exception than the rule.4
Regardless of the metric—for example, the number of hearing requests at one end 
or the number of adjudicated decisions at the other end—and the time period, 
Massachusetts is within the first, litigious world.
   
5  For example, its most recent year’s 
number of 34 adjudicated decisions ranks seventh in the 50 states, with the others in the 
top group being, in alphabetical order, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas .6  Yet, the approximately 500 hearing 
requests, when compared with the number of adjudicated decisions, represent an 
unusually high ratio,7
Moreover, Massachusetts has played a leading role in the history of special 
education law.  Its own positive (i.e., disability-favorable) education legislation pre-dated 
the passage of the original 1975 version of the IDEA.
 which would place Massachusetts notably higher in the top group.    
8
As another, less central indicator of its relatively unusual level of sophistication in 
special education law, Massachusetts is the only state known to the consultant that has a 
specialized publication specific to its hearing officer decisions—specifically, the 
MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL EDUCATION REPORTER, a privately published service that 
features “commentators” from two law firms—one representing school districts and one 
representing parents. 
  Moreover, for several years the 
legislation included a definition of eligibility and a substantive standard for 
appropriateness that clearly exceed the scope and substantive standard under the IDEA.  
Finally, Massachusetts’ prevailing policies for procedural protections, such as the current 
BSEA practice of processing procedural safeguards notices as an automatic consequence 
of every parentally rejected individual education program (IEP), are relatively remarkable 
in comparison to most states. 
 4 
PART II:  OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Observations 
 
1.  The first observation of this report concerns the legal role of state education 
agencies (SEAs), such as the Department, in the conduct of IDEA hearings and 
mediations.  More specifically, under the IDEA and its regulations, the SEA is ultimately 
responsible for the effective operation of the hearing officer and mediation system.9  
Thus, for example, the USED’s Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) has issued 
policy letters clarifying that an SEA may specify the content of hearing officer training as 
part of its ultimate responsibility for oversight of the due process dispute resolution 
system.10  Other requirements for compliance include assuring the impartiality of hearing 
officers and mediators,11 the competence of hearing officers,12 and a specified process of 
pre-judicial dispute resolution.13  For example, the SEA is ultimately responsible for 
timeliness in terms of the 30-day deadline for completion of the pre-hearing resolution 
session and the immediately subsequent 45-day timeline for issuance of the hearing 
officer’s decision.14
The corollary conclusion is that the Department has (a) the responsibility to 
determine the appropriate organizational structure for the IDEA mediation and hearing 
officer functions in Massachusetts and, after the new organizational arrangement is in 
place, (b) the continuing obligation to assure their effective compliance with the 
standards of the IDEA.    
 
 
2.  The second observation is, as made clear in Commissioner’s Chester’s letter of 
inquiry15
memorandum of understanding that put the BSEA under the nominal authority (i.e., 
limited to evaluating the BSEA director and assistant director) of another agency, the 
University of Massachusetts Boston.  Subsequently, that arrangement fell into disuse for 
several structural and pragmatic reasons. 
 and USED’s response, that Massachusetts previously had the same structural 
problem and its purported solution was not effective.  Specifically, in 1992 USED’s 
OSEP only approved of the BSEA structure upon the condition of an interagency  
Consequently, whatever the solution this time to the same problematic situation 
is, it needs to be more clear-cut and enduring than the previous attempt.  OSEP is less 
likely this time to approve of a relatively nominal arrangement,16
 
 and, in any event, the 
lack of stable institutionalization of the solution will only lead to another repetition of the 
problem.  
3.  The third observation is that Massachusetts’ mediation and hearing officer 
system under the IDEA has a well-earned reputation for sophistication and innovation.  
Examples of legal sophistication include the following: 
 
 • the jurisdictional coverage of disputes under the overlapping scope of Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act17
 
 
• the formal adjudicative procedures for addressing pre-hearing and 
interlocutory issues in hearings 
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• the generally thorough factual findings and legal analysis of the hearing 
officer decisions.  
  
The even more outstanding examples of innovation include: 
  
•  the well-regarded effective settlement conferences 
 
•  the availability of advisory opinions18
 
 
•  the development of the new “SPED-EX” procedure, which will provide the 
availability of an advisory opinion based on the perspective of a special 
education clinical professional. 
 
Thus, the effectiveness of the BSEA must be assessed not only in light of the 
state’s litigious special education culture but also with regard to the full range of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators.  For example, the ratio of the 34 adjudicated 
decisions divided by the present number of hearing officers appears on first impression—
compared to other states19—to be relatively low.  Yet, with the same comparison to other 
states, the productivity assessment may be different upon consideration of the 500 
hearing requests, the synergistic and potent effect of mediation, and the sophisticated 
practice in the Massachusetts’ hearings.20
 
 
4.  The perceptions of the various interest groups that provided input in the 
foregoing “Consultant Activities” grouped into two divergent views.  One view, which 
was the majority for a sample that was not random and, thus, not necessarily 
representative of the wider constituencies, was that the present system is not broken and, 
thus, the resolution should be limited to changing the home of the BSEA in response to 
OSEP’s mandate.  Attorneys and other advocates who represented parents of students 
with disabilities were the dominant source of this perception.   
The opposing view, which was the minority in this limited sample and principally 
expressed by attorneys representing school districts, was that the current system is fatally 
flawed and needs radical revision.  A March 20, 2009 letter to the Commissioner signed 
by a group of superintendents, special education directors, and other school district 
administrators, exemplifies this view.21  Their primary relevant perception is that the 
BSEA hearing officers are biased toward parents; these school district representatives 
explained that even though districts win the clear majority of the decisions, they settle the 
vast bulk of the 500 hearing requests based on this perceived bias, thus preserving for 
decision only those cases that they expect to be clear winners.22  While lacking 
information to verify this explanation,23 the consultant notes that the prevailing 
perception in the rest of the adversarial world of special education is that hearing officers 
are biased in favor of districts.24  In any event, the March 20 letter also made the much 
more evident point that the present BSEA system lacks an effective feedback process; in 
contrast, for example, the Commonwealth’s Superior Court regularly conducts an 
anonymous survey of its legal practitioners that provides performance feedback to each 
individual judge and, at the administrative level, the presiding judge.   
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In contrast, both groups generally shared positive perceptions about (a) the 
aforementioned innovations of the BSEA hearing officer system, particularly the assistant 
director’s settlement conferences, and (b) the mediators generally, with one exception—
some of the district participants perceived a chilling effect of the combination of 
geographic mediator assignments and housing the mediators with the hearing officers.25
 
   
5.  Within and across the two divergent views was a general sense that this OSEP-
mandated change, even if limited to no more than a move in the organizational home of 
the BSEA, was an opportunity to strengthen the system.  The identified areas for 
incremental improvement, along with illustrative rather than exclusive ways for 
addressing each, concern these hearing officer issues:26
  
 
•  selection 
e.g., according parties a limited choice in the selection of hearing officers 
within the relatively strict timelines for completion of the process27
   
 
• feedback 
e.g., institutionalizing a system of anonymous constructive participant 
feedback of mediator and hearing officer performance 
 
• accessibility 
e.g., providing for circuit-riding hearing officers 
 
• efficiency-timeliness 
e.g., having incentives for prompt completion of hearings in accordance 
with regulatory timelines 
 
• efficiency-utilization  
e.g., providing cross-training for hearing other types of administrative 
decisions during downward spikes and, depending on the structure, a 
converse managerial provision during upward spikes in caseload  
 
 
Structural Options: Hearing Officers 
 
 The alternative structures for IDEA hearing officers theoretically fit into a 
spectrum of three broad categories: 1) part-time contractors; 2) full-time independent 
contractors, and 3) full-time employees.  As a practical matter, the middle category is 
effectively eliminated, because no state currently uses it and even if full-time hearing 
officers are independent contractors in relation to the SEA—because it uses a contracting 
process for its IDEA hearing officer system—they are typically employees of the agency 
that receives the contract.28
Taking into account all 50 states, the predominant model is the use of part-time 
contractors, with a gradual and still far from complete movement toward the full-time 
employee category.
  Thus, the likely alternatives amount to the two outer 
categories—part-time contractors and full-time employees. 
29  For the nine states in the group that includes Massachusetts, the 
 7 
slight majority—MA and four others (CA, MD, NJ, and PA)—use the full-time employee 
model, whereas the top-ranked30 state (NY)31 and the others (CT, IL, TX) use part-time 
consultants.32
predominant home, by far, is an office of administrative law akin to Massachusetts’ 
Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA).
  Moreover, for those states that use the full-time employee model, the  
33
 As a generic matter,
   
34 the basic advantages of the part-time contractor model are 
control35 and flexibility,36 whereas the disadvantages are less likelihood for expertise, 
independence, and stability.37  Conversely, the basic advantages of the full-time 
employee model are stability and specialization,38 whereas the corresponding 
disadvantages are more potential for inflexibility39 and insularity.40  The variable of 
coherence, if referring to the degree of predictability of analysis and outcome across the 
state’s hearing officers as a whole, is not clearly associated either model; for example, 
although the full-time model can decrease the variability of the part-time model due to 
concentrating the cases among a much smaller number of hearing officers, the variance 
among these remaining hearing officers—particularly in light of its more insular 
structure—can still amount to the same problematic level of what is akin to inter-rater 
reliability.41
 As a specific matter, moving to a part-time contractor model in Massachusetts 
would obviously fulfill the OSEP mandate without moving the organizational home of 
the mediation and hearing officer function, and it would provide flexibility in terms of 
personnel utilization; however, the loss of expertise alone—without adding in the other 
weighty negative costs and complications—would appear to be at least countervailing. 
Conversely, retaining the full-time model would necessitate either moving the 
organizational home of the hearing officers from the Department to either another state 
entity, a private entity, or—within the full range of possible options, although not extant 
in another state—creating a free-standing entity.  For examples of another state entity,
  
42 
the most likely possible candidates are DALA,43 another part of the Executive Office for 
Administration and Finance,44 or the University of Massachusetts (UMass).45
 
  In turn, the 
collaboratives and the private universities with law schools in the Commonwealth serve 
as examples of non-state and private entities, respectively.  Further evaluation of this 
particular model necessitates first the structural options for the mediators and then a set of 
final considerations. 
 
Structural Options: Mediators 
 
 The only limited structural issue specific to mediators in the BSEA is whether 
they should be housed with or apart from the hearing officers.46  The predominant pattern 
in other states, whether limited to those in the top group47
with full-time mediators, is the separation model.  Yet, illustrating the full range, at least 
one of the “top” tier states—California—has the same group of full-time hearing officers 
perform both functions.
 and whether limited to those  
48
As a general matter, the primary advantage and disadvantage of the first option 
respectively are synergy and “leakage.” “Synergy” in this context refers to agile 
interaction between mediators and hearing officers to not only share dispute resolution 
strategies but also–via swift switching from hearing officer to mediator upon the parties’ 
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consent–facilitate prompt settlement.  “Leakage” here refers to interaction between 
mediators and hearing officers that may affect the integrity of each process.  For example, 
if mediators pass on individually identifiable information about the parties or the case, 
even if completely inadvertently or in good faith, to the hearing officer, the potential or 
actual effect would be counter to impartiality.  
The primary advantage and disadvantage of the second option simply are the 
opposite—less likelihood of synergy and leakage.  Overall, as applicable to the present 
practice of the mediators and hearing officers, the balance seems to modestly favor 
retaining having both groups within the same organizational unit; however, other factors 
that may accompany the OSEP-dictated change may counterweigh in favor of a separated 
structural arrangement. For example, if the Commissioner’s decision were to move the 
hearing officers to DALA based on its related specialized function, the same rationale 
might weigh in favor of moving the mediators into the Massachusetts Office of Dispute 
Resolution at UMass/Boston.  This unit appears to have general recognition for effective 
mediation services. 
 
 
Final Considerations 
 
 In any case, after weighing the various structural options, if the Commissioner 
decides to move in the direction of retaining the full-time employee model, a few final 
and intertwined factors merit consideration in the identification of the new host 
organization.  First, in light of past history, is the need for an enduring institutional 
solution, not another nominal, temporary, and ultimately illusory fix.49
Second is the matter of resources, which is a particularly crucial consideration in 
these stringent economic times.  The Department representatives reported that the IDEA 
federal funds are the sole source of the salaries, benefits, travel, and training of the 
BSEA.  As an effective matter, the fixed costs that the Department contributes, such as 
office space, nonportable equipment, and administrative support (e.g., information 
technology services) are not transferable.  Thus, the new host organization, via its 
preexisting infrastructure and internal resource reallocation, or the state legislature 
presumably would have to provide the additional resources necessary for the efficient and 
effective operation of the BSEA.
  
50
Third is the opportunity costs that would be lost if the various concerned 
constituents and the host organization fail to make a concerted commitment to improve, 
not just preserve, the particular strengths of the present system.    
 
Last, concluding this report where it started, whatever organizational option is 
ultimately selected in response to the USED, the Department will remain obligated to 
assure full compliance with the IDEA standards for the special education dispute 
resolution system, which includes but is not entirely limited to the mediation and hearing 
officer functions.51
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       Endnotes 
 
1 Based on the prompt initiation of the scope of services, the Department 
subsequently requested and received an extension until June 1, 2009 for submission of 
the plan. 
2 The remaining, approximately 40 hearing requests were either settled without mediation 
or withdrawn.  Although it may be worthwhile to conduct in-depth tracking and analysis of the 
process between the 500 filings and the 34 decisions beyond the reported mediation success rate, 
such an endeavor was beyond the scope of the consultant’s activities. 
3 In addition to an informal sampling of Massachusetts’ hearing officer decisions, the 
consultant reviewed the BSEA’s HEARING RULES FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS (2008), 
relevant legislation and regulations, and the websites for the various other potentially related 
agencies. 
4 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A 
Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (2008).   This study did 
not include, due to its unique non-state status, the District of Columbia, which has more 
adjudicated hearings than any other jurisdiction.  
5 In the aforementioned Zirkel & Gischlar study of the period 1991-2005, Massachusetts 
ranked ninth, with 724 adjudicated decisions, compared to first-place New York with 16,064 
decisions.  When adjusted on a per capita basis of special education enrollments, Massachusetts 
rank for this 15-year period was 12th.  Moreover, while the number of adjudicated decisions in 
Massachusetts’ averaged 48 for this entire period, the pattern started with an initial three-year 
high level of approximately 100 per year followed by a range of 27 to 40 decisions, with two 
separate upward spikes of 50 and 53, for the remaining years.  
6 This ranking is based on the national survey that the author started with a colleague 
concomitant with this consultancy. The study is still ongoing, and, upon its completion, its results 
will appear in an academic journal. 
7 Eileen Ahearn, Due Process Hearings: 2001 Update, QUICK TURN AROUND FORUM 
(2002)(available at http://www.nasdse.org/forum.htm). 
8 In contrast, various other states had negative legislation that pre-dated the IDEA.  For 
example, Pennsylvania’s compulsory education law specifically excluded children with mental 
retardation. 
9 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.600(d)(2) (2008) (specifying reinforced priority for state 
supervision of dispute resolution system). 
10 Letter to Zirkel, 21 IDELR 1000 (OSEP); Letter to Keenan, 20 IDELR 1166 (1993). 
11 See, e.g., id. §§ 300.506(c) and 300.511(c).  The specific standards include prohibiting 
the mediator or hearing officer from being an SEA employee.  However, via an express 
exclusion, this prohibition does not extend to SEA-paid independent contractors.  Id.  Thus, the 
SEA may have mediators or hearing officers who are independent contractors.  Notably too, this 
prohibition is a relatively long-standing one in the IDEA regulations based on case law in the 
early 1980s, but it is new for mediators as of the 2006 IDEA regulations. 
12 The three expressly identified minimum competencies concern knowledge and ability 
in special education law, conducting hearings, and writing decisions.  Id. § 300.511(c)(1)(ii)-(iv). 
13 Id. §§ 300.506-300.515.  The SEA is also responsible for a separate, administrative 
complaint resolution process.  See, e.g., id. §§ 300.151-300.153; see generally Perry A. Zirkel, 
Legal Boundaries for the IDEA Complaint Resolution Process, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 565 (2008).    
14 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a). 
15 Included in Commissioner’s Chester’s October 7, 2008 letter to USED was a key 
clarification regarding the meaning of “impartial” in this context: 
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[W]e believe that the system in Massachusetts for due process hearings 
and mediations has been and is operating in an impartial manner.  
Neither the Commissioner nor anyone else in the Department, outside of 
the BSEA, reviews or tries to influence in any way decisions of 
individual hearing officers or mediators in ongoing cases.  We have 
received no allegations or complaints regarding the current structure for 
hearings and mediations from anyone.  Impartial in fact, however, may 
be different from the more technical definition of impartial under the 
IDEA. 
For the applicable meaning under the IDEA more generally, see, e.g., Peter Maher & Perry A. 
Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act: A Checklist of Legal Boundaries, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109 (2007); Elaine 
Drager & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 86 
EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1984).    
16 In addition to the same reason, the original case law—to the extent that it focuses on 
the state board of education rather than the state education agency alone—would seem to put in 
question the option moving the home of the BSEA to the Massachusetts Executive Office of the 
Education.  See Robert M. v Benton, 634 F.2d 1139, 1142 n.10 (8th Cir. 1980); Helms v. 
McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 806 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981); Vogel v. Sch. Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989, 994-45 
(S.D. Mo. 1980). 
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20), 794, and 794a (2008); 34 C.F.R. Part 104 (2008).  See, e.g., 
PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (2004). 
18 Often credited with this innovation because it appears in the state’s legislation, 
Connecticut apparently relied on the Massachusetts model to incorporate the advisory opinion 
into its IDEA dispute resolution procedures. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76h-6 (2008). 
19 By way of illustration, Pennsylvania’s 5 full-time hearing officers issued 
approximately 55 adjudicated decisions during the most recent year.  Among other variables for 
comparison, for example, the number of hearing requests during that year in Pennsylvania was 
approximately 20% higher than the Massachusetts’ total.   
20 Further complicating the initial comparison are the lack of available data as to the full-
time equivalents for the various states with part-time hearing officers and the similar unclear 
number of adjudicated decisions for those states with full-time hearing officers who have a 
caseload that extends well beyond special education cases. 
21 A notable number of the criticisms expressed in the letter reflect more generalized 
frustration and concern that go beyond the specific system of the BSEA.  For example, several of 
the criticisms focused on the differing interpretations of the IDEA mandate for least restrictive 
environment (LRE), which is not at all specific to Massachusetts’ system.  Similarly, the 
expressed concerns with 1) the overlapping but differential processes of SEA 
compliance/complaint investigations and hearing office adjudications and 2) the financial burden 
of attorneys’ fees, private placements, and complicated proceedings, and 3) the “legalistic rather 
than humanistic” process are part and parcel of the IDEA as legislated at the national level and as 
implemented at the state level, especially in the litigious “world” that Massachusetts shares with 
an identifiable segment of other states.   
22 A related prevailing perception among this district-dominated group is that one or two 
particular hearing officers are most pronounced in this purported pro-parent bias.  
23 In contrast, the March 29 letter’s three cited examples of hearing officer bias—an 
excerpted statement of the hearing officers, their control at hearings, and their professional 
background—were amenable to assessment; the consultant found each of these allegations to be 
an exaggeration that had been clearly distorted for the purposes of advocacy. 
24 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Blaming the Referee, 37 COMMUNIQUÉ 11 (Sept. 2008). 
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25 Although they have the option of requesting an exception, they perceive possible 
negative effects, particularly in light of the otherwise synergistic placement of hearing officers 
and mediators in the same unit.  
26 Less significantly, each of these issues also applies to mediators, with adjustment of the 
first one from selection to assignment.  More specifically, having mediators assigned on a 
rotational or random basis would be one means of addressing the aforementioned (see supra text 
accompanying note 25) perceived chilling effect.  
27 More specifically, one way would be to provide for preliminary random assignment of 
three hearing officers for each case, with the opportunity for each party to “strike” one name on 
this list before the final assignment of the hearing officer (without any communication of the 
preliminary screening actions to the hearing officer) within a prescribed short period.  Only two 
states—Arkansas and Kansas—have any sort of such “bumping” provision 
28 Specifically, California previously had this arrangement when the successful bidder 
was the University of Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, but for the SEA’s most recent two 
successive requests for proposals the state’s office of administrative hearings (which is the 
counterpart to DALA in Massachusetts) succeeded in obtaining the SEA’s contract for hearings 
and mediation.  Only the outlier jurisdiction of the District of Columbia (see supra note 4) 
currently uses full-time independent contractors as hearing officers. 
29 At the current time, approximately 15 states use the full-time employee model. 
30 See supra note 5. 
31 However, New York is a two-tiered state, and its review officer level fits in a full-time 
employee category.  All of the other states in the top group have one-tier systems, with 
Pennsylvania being the most recent to follow the trend from two tiers to one.  The IDEA allows 
each state the option of either a hearing officer level alone or an added review-officer tier before 
judicial review. 
32 For these three states, the home is the SEA; this choice does not violate the IDEA 
impartiality requirement because the hearing officers are not employees.  See supra note 11. 
33 The only exception in the top group is Pennsylvania, which uses an “intermediate unit” 
(a governmental educational agency between the local and the state levels, with the only partial 
counterpart in Massachusetts being the collaboratives).  The only exception in the other group of 
states is Tennessee, which uses the Secretary of State’s office as the home for this purpose.  
Illustrating the full range of options, the states in the part-time independent contractor category 
that do not fit in the predominant pattern of the SEA being the home (see supra note 29 and 
accompanying text) extend to Virginia, which uses the state supreme court, and Oklahoma, which 
contracts with a university, to serve as the home.  Consider too the example of the previous, 
private-university home in California (see supra note 28). 
34 On both sides of the generic balance sheet, the pluses and minuses are potential rather 
than necessarily actual, being merely more probable theoretically depending ultimately on the 
quality and nature of the specific implementation. 
35 “Control” as an objective advantage refers here to managerial efficiency and 
accountability.  
36 The primary aspect of flexibility in this context is the ability to respond to the ebbs and 
flows of hearing activity on not only the long- but also the short-term basis. 
37 The need, at least in a state like Massachusetts, for periodic procurement processes 
may also be a disadvantage in terms of the transaction costs. 
38 In this context, these two terms encompass the expertise that not only full-time focus 
but also inter-employee interaction facilitates. 
39 Again, the primary referent for inflexibility is in terms of efficiency.  See supra note 
36. 
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40 “Insularity” in this context refers to an extreme of independence that impedes 
accountability. 
41 Inter-rater reliability refers to the degree of consistency among the recorded judgments 
of various observers. 
42 The use of “examples” here warrants emphasis; there may be other state entities that 
would ultimately be more appropriate upon full exploration. 
43 The primary reason for DALA would be its institutional focus on administrative 
hearings, thereby providing stability and expertise.  However, such a re-location should be 
contingent upon intra-institution semi-autonomy; California and New Jersey provide importable 
and successful examples of a sub-unit of specialized hearing officers for IDEA cases, with cross-
training for limited assignments to and from this sub-unit depending on the changing in- and out-
flow of cases. 
44 The primary reason for this agency is that it already includes a wide variety of 
functions, including semi-autonomous units akin to BSEA, within its management structure.  See, 
e.g., http://www.mass.gov/bb/gaa/fy2009/app_09/ga_09/hcdefault.htm. 
45 The primary reasons for UMass would be its various campuses, thus providing 
institutional access to hearings in various parts of the state and the potential for mutual benefit in 
terms of student internships and faculty research. 
46 In contrast, the issue of full-time employee v. part-time consultant status was not at 
issue for the mediators; the stakeholder’s perceptions, the available data, and the policy-making 
constituents all supported their effectiveness, including impartiality, in their present status, albeit 
in a different home. 
47 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
48 By virtue of the training, they are certified mediators and conduct the mediations but 
never for the same case in which they serve as hearing officers. 
49 See supra note 16.  For example, retaining the physical location of the BSEA personnel 
within the Department’s offices would not appear, despite its patent immediate appeal, to be a 
viable option after careful consideration.  
50 Essential elements of such operation include 1) at least semi-autonomy for continued 
specialized and stable expertise, and 2) management for full utilization and accountability.  
51 Again, if the decision is for a new organizational host, essential to fulfillment of the 
Commissioner’s obligation (see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text) will be incorporation of 
an effective Department check-and-balancing mechanism. 
